Berlin Conference: Mulling Over Balochistan, Et Al

By Malik Siraj Akbar

My friend Dr. Martin Axmann, who heads the Pakistan office of the German foundation Hanns Seidel Stiftung (HSS), extended me an invitation to speak about the Balochistan conflict at the South Asia Forum.

The event was being organized in the German capital, Berlin, in the first week of July by the organization Martin represents in Pakistan. His book Back to Future, which was published by Oxford University Press, is a wonderful  account of the genesis of Baloch nationalism in the first half of  the twentieth century.

I delightedly accepted the invitation for two reasons. Firstly, I love Berlin because of its omnipresent motivational political graffiti and the unique history of bringing down the Berlin Wall with people’s unflinching desire to discard man-made borders and unite people. Secondly, the conference was going to provide me an opportunity to listen to the views of some “controversial” Pakistani politicians whose ideas often did not match with the thoughts of the country’s security establishment.

I was probably the last panelist to arrive in Berlin after I missed my flight from Zurich, Switzerland,  to the German capital. Actually, most flights from Washington DC and New York reported delay on that day because of bad weather. When I reached in Zurich after a long flight from Washington DC, my scheduled flight had already left. Luckily, the airline company booked me for the next flight which was about to take off within four hours.

The two-day long Berlin conference revolved around the theme called “In Afghanistan’s shadow: Ethnic and religious violence in Pakistan.” Besides the nationalist political leaders, the host organization had also invited representatives of the media, civil society and academia to discuss a host of Pakistan’s domestic issues which have equally contributed to the country’s instability.

In addition, the conference was intended to educate the western audience about matters pertaining to democracy, military-civilian relationship, demography, radicalization and the social set-up of Pakistan. We visited the German Chancellery, Foreign Relations Committee and the Department of Defense.

The first session of the conference focused on the Afghan war, process of reconciliation and the situation in the aftermath of the withdrawal of troops by the United States and the allies. Michael Steiner, German government’s Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, said the presence of Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad had raised “justified questions” for which the government of Pakistan would have to provide an explanation.

He expressed dissatisfaction over Islamabad’s economic policies. Regarding Afghanistan, he said the process of reconciliation over there had to be indigenous which must be respected by the neighboring countries of the war-torn nation.  The impression that Afghanistan is currently in control of the United States and NATO forces is misleading, he said, because several Muslim countries have also contributed troops to peacekeeping forces in Afghanistan.

Asfandyar Khan Wali, president of the Awami National Party (ANP), said Pashtuns in Afghanistan and Pakistan were actually two faces of the same coin. He enlightened the audience about the role of Hujra [a social institution] and the masjid [mosque] in the Pashtun society.

“The Hujra has historically been the most powerful institution in the Pashtun society,” he said, “The masjid has always been subservient to the decisions made by the Hujra.” He pointed out that all wars of resistance in Afghanistan in the past had been based on Afghan nationalism. However, the current resistance in Afghanistan, for the first time, is motivated on religious lines rather than solely Pashtun nationalism.

Mr. Khan, who is also the chairman of National Assembly’s Standing Committee on Foreign Relations, candidly admitted that he did not know much about the country’s foreign policy because it was mainly focused on India and Afghanistan and the country’s military establishment, not the politicians,  solely dealt with these two‘sensitive issues’.

Interestingly, Mr. Khan sounded as weary of foreign forces in Afghanistan as the Taliban do. When I asked what would happen if Taliban returned to power in Afghanistan and resorted to human rights violations by punishing their political opponents, Mr. Khan said it was “for us, the Pashtuns, to decide about our future. Once the foreign forces are gone, we can take care of ourselves.”

No doubt, the ANP has had to pay a very heavy price in the war on terror. As the war from Afghanistan, what President Obama calls the “cancer”, has shifted to Pakistan, secular and liberal forces have had to suffer in the hands of the Islamic militants. Besides being victimized, I thought ANP had also surrendered to some extent in front of the Islamists. It no longer had a road-map to defeat Islamic obscurantists. With Mr. Khan holding a key position in the Pakistani government, it is no longer easy to directly criticize the big guns in the country’s establishment and retain the chairmanship of the Senate’s standing committee on foreign relations.

One such instance was Mr. Khan’s critique of the ISI and the military over their support to the Islamists but he, at the same time, pleased the people from the Pakistani embassy who were sitting at the conference.

“How can the Pakistani army support Islamists,” he questioned, “when several army officers and their children have themselves been killed and injured by these religious groups?”

As Mr. Khan raised this question, I realized the Pakhtun nationalists had conceded, not happily but as a compulsion, to the fact that it is not possible in the current circumstances to offer unconditional and unilateral resistance to Pakistani Taliban and the pro-Taliban elements in the Pakistani military. It was understandable but tragic at the same time.

The next session on Balochistan attracted a large audience, including officials from the Pakistani and Indian embassies who kept on taking notes but did not ask questions.

Former senator Sanaullah Baloch of the Balochistan National Party (BNP) enthralled the audience with his impressive presentation on the conflict-stricken province. He spoke in detail about the geo-strategic importance of the province, its mineral wealth and the current state of human rights in the province. He recounted how the government of General Musharraf unleashed a military operation in Balochistan and killed top Baloch nationalist leaders including Nawab Akbar Bugti, a former governor and chief minister of the province. Later on, his party’s secretary general, Habib Jalib Baloch, was also killed as the conflict escalated.

“Islamabad is engaged in a full genocide of the Baloch people,” he alleged, “thousands of dissenters have been forced to disappear and hundreds have been killed and dumped. The country’s judiciary takes no notice of the violation of human rights in Balochistan”

This writer spoke about “Secessionist movements and sub-national surge in Balochistan.” Tracing back the rise of the current insurgency to the killing of Nawab Bugti in 2006, I said the most alarming part of the conflict was both parties’ [Baloch and the government] stated positions and unwillingness to provide some concessions to each other to pave the way for constructive dialogue on the conflict.

“The current movement has trickled down to the middle-class educated Baloch youth who aggressively and regularly use social media, blogs and the internet to promote their cause. Traditional tribal chiefs no longer have control over these young activists,” I said.

The panel on Balochistan also included Mahmood Khan Achakzai, chairman of the Pashtunkhawa Milli Awami Party and Suleman Dawood, a Baloch tribal elder.

Throughout the conference, the Khan of Kalat was the most interesting character I met. It was my first meeting with him since I heard of him for the first time in September 2006 after he had convened a Jirga in Kalat soon after the killing of Nawab Akbar Bugti. The Jirga had decided to challenge the State of Pakistan at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) at the Hague. As expected, the ICJ was never moved as most participants of the jirga joined the government. Even three members of the Khan’s family are currently serving as ministers in the Balochistan government.

The night before the inception of the conference, the Khan had approached the conference organizers to object over inviting me to speak up at the event.

“He is not even a Baloch,” he had told the organizers and the panelists over dinner.

“We do not care,” one of the organizers had reportedly told him, “but he writes on Balochistan more than we can possibly read.”

When I learned about it, I smiled and said I was not surprised at all over the attitude of a Baloch tribal elite. We have grown up in societies where we frequently hear things about rivals being “not a Muslim”, “not a patriotic” or “not a Baloch”. When societies evolve, such behaviors become commonplace.

We represented two different faces of Balochistan.  On the onne hand, you had one tribal elite who had no political party or political background but was still important because of the greatness of his ancestors. On the other hand, there was the rise of the educated middle class from remote areas like Mekran and Kharan. The middle class in Balochistan is up today, equipped with knowledge, social media and free thoughts. They refuse to abide by any restrictions and dictations which clash with basic human instinct of freedom. Such a phenomenal social change is but destined to face resistance, above all from those who wish to retain the status quo.

One of my school teachers often used to say, “If the son of a commissioner becomes a commissioner then it is no big deal but if the son of a peon attains education and becomes  a commissioner then it is a big deal.”

As a young self-made Baloch, I felt this conference introduced me with some disturbing challenges of practical life. I remained calm but tried to learn better lessons so that Balochs of my generation did not demonstrate negative attitude similar to what the Khan did toward me. In primitive yet emerging societies if a man cannot compete with a woman at the class or an office then he often resorts to her character assassination to  discourage her from doing the good work she is doing. Similarly, in the field of politics and media, if people do not tolerate each other then then they resort to abusive comments.

My generation  of Balochs has suffered enormously during the fresh conflict but still some leaders are engaged in disunity and disrespect for their younger educated people. Balochistan needs more educated, accommodating and respectful young boys and girls who help each other in accomplishing their personal, professional and collective goals.

However, what inspired me at the Berlin conference was the cooperative attitude of the Pashtun leaders toward each other. Similar to any society, the Pakhtuns may have their internal differences and fights but they would not let the external world know about them. They would always pretend that they were absolutely united and shared similar ideas.

One such example was the presentation of Mr. Isfandyar Khan Wali who would always refer to Mahmood Khan Achakzai as “my brother who knows more than me” or he would say “you may ask Mahmood Khan if I am wrong.” When Mahmood Khan’s turn came, he uttered similar words and phrases of respect for Mr. Wali Khan.

During the session on Karachi, for instance, both the veteran leaders stood up together and said they had a joint complaint. When asked what their grievance was, they said it was unfair to discuss Kararchi without having a Pakhtun on the panel. To this, I stood up saying that the Sindh Assembly had more Baloch MPAs than the Pakhtuns. Therefore, the Baloch representation in the panel on Karachi was even more important.

In his presentation, the Khan of Kalat showed the old flag of the Kalat State which clearly showed a deep sense of Islamic identity. This was actually revealing to me that a Baloch leader who stands for independence of Balochistan has such a strong attachment with Islam. There is surely nothing wrong with being a good or a staunch Muslim on a  personal account but making religion an inseparable part of the State was debatable.

Thus, in my talk I said it was up to the people of Balochistan whether they wanted to live with Pakistan or seek independence but  they needed to clarify their stance on the following questions.

• What is going to be the role of religion in an independent Balochistan?
• What will be the status of the tribal system?
• How will land reforms be carried out?
• What role will women have in the country’s polity and administration?
• What will the Baloch foreign policy look like?

At the end of the first day’s session, the Khan of Kalat seemed to have digested all my questions but remained discomforted over raising the issue of religion and state. As my friend Sanaullah Baloch and I sat in the shade in front of the hotel to enjoy rain over some coffee, the Khan approached me again.

“Why did you raise the topic of religion and state,” he asked.

I knew he had been offended and hurt by this question. If you read Inside Balochistan, the autobiography of Mir Ahmed Yar Khan, the Khan of Kalat during whose time Pakistan forcefully captured Balochistan, you would realize how assertive the Khans of Kalat were in terms of their Islamic identity. Suleman Dawood was not different from Ahmed Yar Khan when it came to Islam.

“Khan sahib,” I said, “was it not a valid and timely question?”

“Yes, but who asked you to raise this question? You must have raised it on behest of someone else,” he alleged.

“No Waja. This is an important question,” I clarified.

“But how dare you raise this question?” he insisted.

“Because the world demands answers to such questions,” I added.

“F**k the mother of the world,” he protested, “but who are you to raise this question?”

“This is Berlin, not Kalat,” I reminded him, “we, as the citizens of Balochistan, have the right to discuss these questions.”

“It is clear,” he remarked, “Islam is our state religion. What else do you want?”

“Then how is Balochistan going to be different from the Islamic Republic of Pakistan?” I quizzed.

He said everyone would be free to practice his religion. Even Mr. Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan, had promised so but the pledge was never kept. This was a very ambiguous promise.

“So does it mean that you will declare all the Zikris as non-Muslims as Pakistan declared the Ahmedis?” I posed another question.

Zikris are a sectarian Muslim minority who perform all pillars of Islam but their Zikr Khanas, similar to mosques, do not have pulpits pointed toward Muslim holy city of Mecca. Besides the standard Islamic Hajj, the Zikris perform an important religious pilgrimage called Zikr-e-Elahi at Koh-e-Murad in Turbat district from 25th to 28th days of Ramdan, the holy month in which Muslims fast and mark the revelation of the Quran.

The Pakistani governments, particularly that of General Zia-ul-Haq, tried its level best to alienate the orthodox Muslims of Mekran (also called nimazis) from the Zikris, who are native Balochs. The local Balochs, who are largely moderate secular Muslims, strongly foiled such efforts. In the Baloch society, religion is strictly a personal matter and people do not care what religious belief their friends and neighbors follow.

For us, the Zikris are Balochs first and their religious belief is irrelevant in our socialistic interactions. The contributions of Zikris in Baloch economy, literature and society are phenomenal. I fear the increasing radicalization of the Baloch society because of the Tableegi Jamaat’s activities and the expansion of the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI), the pro-Taliban Islamic party, will lead to some efforts to marginalize the Zikris in terms of their religious freedom. The local leaders of JUI, who are also the prayer leaders in local mosques, are instrumental in backing discrimination against the Zikri population.

Back in Berlin, my coffee had finished but the Khan looked too smug to respond to my questions.

“You know what?” he concluded, “I am more educated than all of you sitting here. I have the kind of degrees that you people do not have.”

This was the most depressing and disappointing conversation I had ever had with a Baloch “leader”. I feared if some Baloch leaders continued their obsession with religion like this,  Balochistan, if it ever gains independence, will end up as a failed state like Pakistan. Pakistan failed mainly because it made religion an essential part of the country’s political system.

Likewise, Bangladesh could have become a more developed country if it had refrained from imitating Pakistan. Bangladesh had a remarkable journey toward its independence because of its educated and progressive leaders and intellectuals. They failed to march smoothly toward progress as they began to think that they also needed to have “more Islam” and “more military” in the country’s political affairs.

An independent Balochistan will badly fail if it emulates the Pakistani model by becoming a religious state where land reforms are not encouraged and wealth is accumulated in the accounts of some tribal chiefs.

The next day, as gunshots were being fired back in Karachi because of fresh outbreak of ethnic violence, the session on “Karachi: Demography, economy & ethnic violence in Pakistan’s trade and transport hub” generated heated discussion and knotty questions.

Journalist Zulfiqar Halepoto and the city’s former mayor Syed Mustafa Kamal provided two enlightening perspectives about Karachi. Boris Wilke, a senior research fellow at the University of Bielefeld, spoke about “Civil clashes, suicide attacks, ethnic violence and targeted killings”.

It seemed that the root of the problem with the warring factions in the country’s largest city is the notion of victimhood. Everyone, who is often described by the members of the other ethnic groups as an oppressor, presents himself as the biggest victim of the demographic changes caused in Karachi over the years.

Several people among the audience curiously asked the panelists what could be the best solution to bring peace in Karachi, which is seen by every job-searcher as the city of hope.

“All political parties should sit together and negotiate over Karachi’s problems,” proposed journalist Halepoto but soon stunned the audience, “yet, let’s be clear about one thing: Karachi belongs to Sindh and Sindhis. There cannot be any compromise on the Sindhi control over Karachi.”

This was surely one perspective but it also highlighted the actual problem of even the moderates’ unwillingness to budge from their stated positions on Karachi. The fight over the ‘city of lights’, it appeared, was all about the population’s inability to reconcile with the fact that modern large cities cannot belong to only one ethnic group. Big cities depend on those who have something to offer for their development, a lesson the stakeholders in Karachi still refuse to easily learn.

The last session of conference focused on the Talibanization of Pakistan. The presentations included Religious parties and intra-Islamic faultlines in contemporary Pakistan [Professor Dr. Jamal Malik, University of Erfurt] and Kashmir: From national self-determination to ‘international jihad’ [Dr. Dietrich Reetz, ZMO Berlin].

The presentation of Dr. Mumtaz Ahmed, president of the International Islamic University, Islamabad, on The Talibanization of Pakistan: A case of Southern Punjab” was very informative. According to him, the districts of Jhang, Dera Ghazi Khan and  Muzaffargarh had become the hub of Punjabi-Taliban.

For many years, the Pakistan People’s Party and the Pakistan Muslim League have depended on the votes of the Sunni militant group Sipah-e-Sahaba. In return, the two mainstream national parties return the ‘favors’ of the anti-Shia group by releasing the activists group who are often detained for committing different sectarian crimes.

“Around 28 members of the parliament belonging to the PPP and PML were voted with the help of the Sipah-e-Sahaba,” he informed, “the Punjabi Taliban have diversified their sources of income ranging from their control over most of the travel agencies in Karachi to the ownership of trade of sacrificial animals during Eid.”

Prior to the commencement of the conference, I had an interesting encounter with Dr. Mumtaz Ahmed with a fascinating story.

“Are you the Dr. Mumtaz from Hampton University?” I asked.

“Yes, I am,” he replied.

“You know what? I became a journalist because of you,” I recalled.

“How come? but we have never met,” he inquired, astonished.

I told him when I was very young, my father would often regularly listen to BBC Urdu service on his small pocket-size radio in our native district of Panjgur. The BBC would often ask Dr. Mumtaz Ahmed to comment on important political issues. I would curiously ask my father why the radio host often interviewed this professor.

“My son,” he used to say, “Professors are highly educated people. They have read a lot of books. They know what happened in the past and predict about the future. They are called political analysts.”

“I want to be a political analyst too,” I said as I developed an interest after my father’s praise for Dr. Mumtaz and other political analysts and commentators. My father would laugh over my weird desire to become a political commentator. Yet, he warned as well as encouraged me, “Nothing is impossible in this  life, my son, but you will have to read a lot of books and work very hard. These professors spend all their time in libraries. They are adorable people.”

Here I was, with a man who had inspired me to become a journalist without ever meeting in person. For me, it was an important meeting and a mile stone to become a panelist with Dr. Mumtaz at the same conference. I never informed my father about this as I do not know if he still recalls our conversations about BBC analysts though he still religiously listens to BBC Radio.

Having heard my story, Dr. Mumtaz laughed and sarcastically said, “So now you know how knowledgeable the professors actually are?”

This year’s South Asia Forum was concluded with the remarks of Mr. Paul Lehrieder, German parliament’s deputy head of the group on South Asia, who conveyed the German government’s concerns about the killings of liberals in Pakistan allegedly by the Islamic radicals and the secret services.

Most panelists in the conference collectively shared the desire of separation of the military from the country’s politics, continuity of the democratic process, an end to whatever official patronage the Islamic radial groups enjoy from the country’s intelligence agencies, equal rights to all provinces and more investment on social development to overcome Pakistan’s gradual descent into chaos.

It was uncanny that our politicians could sit together to discuss their problems outside the country but inside Pakistan they still lack the will to respectfully and patiently listen to each other’s point of view.

A German friend evocatively remarked, “you people will surmount all of its existing problems if you sit together inside your country, identify the common enemy and struggle together to bring prosperity to your people.”